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Abstract—	  A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted at 
the NASA Ames Research Center Vertical Motion Simulator, 
where instrument-rated pilots completed a simulated terminal 
descent phase of a lunar landing.  Ten pilots participated in a 2 
x 2 mixed design experiment, with level of automation as the 
within-subjects factor and failure frequency as the between-
subjects factor.  The two evaluated levels of automation were 
high (fully automated landing) and low (manual controlled 
landing).  During test trials, participants were exposed to 
either a high number of failures (75% failure frequency) or 
low number of failures (25% failure frequency). In order to 
investigate the pilots’ sensitivity to changes in levels of 
automation and failure frequency, the dependent measure 
selected for this experiment was accuracy of failure diagnosis, 
from which D Prime and Decision Criterion were derived. 
For each of the dependent measures, no significant difference 
was found for level of automation and no significant 
interaction was detected between level of automation and 
failure frequency.  A significant effect was identified for failure 
frequency suggesting failure frequency has a significant effect 
on pilots’ sensitivity to failure detection and diagnosis.  
Participants were more likely to correctly identify and 
diagnose failures if they experienced the higher levels of 
failures, regardless of level of automation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Future space exploration missions need to better integrate 
humans and automation, particularly during spacecraft 
vehicle control. While advances in automation progress, 
there is limited research on how best to integrate the pilot 
with these new aerospace systems. This research (a 
continuation of [1] and [2]) investigates the lunar 
exploration mission, simulating landings, a time-critical 
phase of flight. 
Flying a spacecraft is a complex task that involves 
comprehensive understanding of the instruments and how 
they affect the spacecraft, constant situation awareness of 
past states and the current state in order to predict possible 
future states, evaluation of risks and benefits, and decision-
making.  It is important that pilots are able to operate under 
periods of high workload in the event of a malfunction.  In 
many instances, such as entry, descent, landing, and 
docking, flying may be coupled with time-critical situations 
where the choices made in a matter of seconds can 
determine mission success or failure.  
Even during Apollo 11, astronauts encountered human-
automation integration issues. Some of the complications 
that occurred include computer information overload 
resulting in alarms sounding and software restarts, 
instability of the throttle control algorithm causing the 
descent engine to oscillate uncontrollably, and even loss of 
communication [3]. This illustrates the significance of 
training pilots to understand how the automated system 
works. 
 
High cognitive demand is placed on pilots during spacecraft 
vehicle control as they must detect, diagnose, and recover 
from system failures. For lunar terminal descent, the 
challenge is exacerbated due to the limited time available to 
recover from such failures. Additionally, the amount of 
automation provided to the pilot in turn impacts these 
demands. The degree of trust an operator has in the 
automation and the automation’s failure frequency is 
associated with the effective use of these systems.  If the 
automation fails often, the operator will be reluctant to make 
use of it, but if the automation is impeccable, the operator 
will rely heavily on it [4].  Failure frequency is only one of 
many factors influencing operator use of automation.   
 
It is important to understand the conditions that influence a 
pilot’s confidence in the automation and a pilot’s ability to 
detect failures to mitigate potential complications that may 
occur as a result, such as decreased situational awareness 
and overall mission abortion. Hence, our research goals 
were to evaluate pilot failure detection and diagnosis, during 
flight and landing on the lunar surface, as they adapted to 
spacecraft failures, failure frequency, and different 
spacecraft levels of automation. 
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2. HUMAN-AUTOMATION INTERACTION  
The term “automation” has been refined and redefined over 
the last 60 or so years. Sheridan defines automation as 
“...any mechanical or electronic replacement of labor, where 
labor is taken to mean either physical labor or mental labor” 
[5].  Today the term is used across domains such as space, 
aviation, automotive, medical, and home and entertainment; 
its meaning has expanded to include 1) artificial sensory 
mechanization and integration, 2) computer processing, 3) 
mechanical activity, and 4) “information action” [6].  In the 
current experiment we apply Sheridan’s definition of 
automation and split the labor between high or low 
automation, which are later explained in more detail.  
Issues with human-automation interaction have become 
more salient as automation became more complex without 
correspondingly investigating the effects this had on the 
person’s ability to control vehicles.  For instance, in 1997, 
while on approach for landing, a commercial aircraft 
crashed 19-miles southwest of Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
County Airport [7]. The crew was operating on autopilot 
and did not understand the autopilot state, so their 
adjustments to the autopilot worsened the controllability of 
the airplane.  According to the Flight Deck Automation 
Issues Database [8], reduced situation awareness and pilots 
being out-of-the-loop were contributing factors in this 
incident.  Perhaps if the pilots had been flying in a manual 
mode, they would have noticed the change in dynamics (of 
icing effects) and would have been able to intervene prior to 
any loss of control.  This incident is indicative of the 
significance that the level of automation places on an 
operator’s ability to detect an anomaly and correct the issue 
in a timely manner. 
3. FAILURE DETECTION 
Failure detection and diagnosis is key in space and other 
high risk and/or time sensitive settings, such as those 
encountered in search and rescue operations, aviation, 
military operations, medicine, and nuclear power plant 
management.  Timely failure detection provides operators 
with potentially more time to diagnose and intervene before 
the situation escalates from manageable to fatal.  For 
instance, in aviation, pilots must be able to quickly detect an 
anomaly, such as with the Flight Management System 
(FMS), and take the appropriate steps to rectify the issue. 
Pilots must detect a target stimulus among background 
noise, in this case, an anomaly within the large, complex set 
of system information. 
Performance of failure detection tasks in human-automation 
interactions has been used to measure the effects of 
automation on the operator, such as complacency [9, 10, 11] 
and reliance.  Complacency can occur when an operator’s 
role goes from manually being in control to simply 
overseeing a highly reliable system [9].  When an operator 
becomes complacent, dependency on the automation to alert 
of system inconsistencies (whether accurate or faulty) 
occurs, thus allowing for vigilance to decrease.  Reliance 
refers to the operator’s dependence or trust when the 
automation is functioning without alarms, indicating there 
are no problems.  Reliant operators have the mental 
resources available to attend to other tasks because they are 
dependent on the automation to alert them when a problem 
arises.  Previous studies have suggested that reliance and 
compliance are independent constructs. In a study to 
investigate the relationship between automation reliance and 
compliance, Dixon, Wickens, and McCarley [12] found that 
operator performance is affected by automation false alarms 
as a result of reduced operator reliance. The frequency that 
operators encounter failures may also affect operator 
reliance and compliance. 
4. AUTOMATION INTEGRATION 
With increased automation of systems, the responsibility of 
the human operator has evolved to meet these changing 
roles. The shift in function allocation, though beneficial, has 
not come without obstacles. For example, a pilot monitoring 
a dynamic system (e.g. autopilot) must detect subtle changes 
that may not be as easily detected as if he were actively in 
control [13].  
Supervisory Control of Automation 
As evidenced in prior research, the human role as a 
supervisory controller or monitor can account for 
degradation in situational awareness and skill, system over-
reliance or complacency, mode-related errors, and 
ultimately mission failure [9, 11, 14, 15, 16].  These are 
consequences of changing the human role from active 
operator to monitor.  In a field study by Wiener [17] to 
evaluate new glass cockpit technology, pilots’ task was to 
monitor complex or dynamic systems. In situations where 
the automation reverted back to the human for decision-
making, the pilots reported being caught off guard with 
regards to the status of the system, a phenomenon referred 
to as automation surprise [18].  Additionally, pilots reported 
feeling out-of-the-loop and described loss of situational 
awareness [17]. 
Levels of Automation 
Levels of automation indicate the degree to which the 
human operator or the automation has control or 
authorization over specific tasks.  Various levels of 
automation taxonomies have been developed to examine the 
most effective approach to achieve goals relative to the 
domain at hand [19, 20, 21, 22].  Transitioning between 
levels of automation is an area of on-going research.  
A common condition that manifests when operators become 
complacent is referred to as out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity 
(OOTLUF) [23].  OOTLUF refers to the phenomenon of 
operators working in conjunction with automation and who 
do not perform well when having to take over manual 
control in the event of an automation malfunction.  This 
occurs because the operator becomes accustomed to 
passively monitoring the system, so when their role 
instantaneously changes, their skills and situational 
awareness may have deteriorated. 
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In a study to analyze OOTLUF and information sampling 
strategies, Lorenz, Di Nocera, Rötger, and Parasuraman [24] 
studied the performance of 24 participants on three tasks: 1) 
monitoring system states, 2) alarm reaction time, and 3) 
memory task. All participants experienced each of the three 
tasks, while the level of automation condition was a 
between-subjects factor. Results indicated that automation 
improved operator performance and reduced operator 
workload.  There was a noticeable decrease in performance 
in the high-level automation condition when the automation 
failed.  Additionally, information sampling strategies 
suggested that level of automation helped to keep task 
emphasis from varying so much, thus retaining situation 
awareness.  Overall, the high-level of automation condition 
left operators with more cognitive resources to oversee the 
system. 
Situation Awareness 
Situational awareness (SA) is the perception, 
comprehension, and projection of elements in the 
operational environment [25]. Maintaining SA contributes 
to piloting task successful performance.  Lack of SA, in 
turn, contributes to loss of vehicle and life, for example 
[26]. 
Research has shown that higher levels of automation are 
associated with out-of-the-loop syndrome, the consequence 
of complacency and degradation in skill and situation 
awareness, resulting from prolonged supervisory control of 
automation [15].  Furthermore, the greater trust an operator 
places on automation, the less likely the operator is to attend 
to the system and detect an anomaly.  In a study of detection 
of changes in system dynamics, Kessel and Wickens [13] 
compared detection performance between operators 
controlling and monitoring system dynamics. Results from 
this study indicate that detection is slower when an operator 
is in an automatic mode, in comparison to a manual control 
mode.  Additionally, there is a positive-transfer from the 
manual mode to the automatic mode, which implies that it is 
best to train operators in a manual level of automation 
because they will be more perceptive of system changes 
once they transfer to a more automatic level of automation.  
Parasuraman et. al. [11] suggested that having operators 
intermittently take over control of automated systems 
improves failure detection.  Further, imbedding artificial 
failures at arbitrary times, during non-critical flight periods, 
may help decrease operator complacency. 
5. METHOD 
Apparatus 
To evaluate failure frequency throughout different levels of 
automation and how failure frequency and level of 
automation affect operators’ flying performance in terms of 
safety and failure detection and diagnosis, an experiment 
was conducted in the NASA Ames Research Center Vertical 
Motion Simulator (VMS). The experiment set-up followed a 
similar setup to that of Kaderka, 2013 [2].  
The VMS consists of an interchangeable cab that can 
produce high fidelity, real-time piloted simulations with 
appropriate motion cueing, resulting in realistic sensory 
feedback relative to a vehicle’s flight characteristics.  The 
motion simulator has a range of motion of up to 60 feet 
vertically, 40 feet horizontally, and 8 feet laterally.  The 
interior cab is modified to replicate aerospace vehicles’ 
flight controls and displays and out-the-window views [27]. 
The Interchangeable Cab (ICAB) was customized in the 
interior by installing flight controls, flight instruments, and 
aircraft seats to emulate Apollo lander spacecraft.  The lunar 
ICAB was placed on the six degrees-of-freedom motion-
based simulator.   
The cockpit displays that participants used to navigate the 
lunar lander included the Horizontal Situation Display 
(HSD), Primary Flight Display (PFD), and Landing Area 
Display (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Cockpit displays layout 
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The HSD provided a pictorial view of the vehicle’s position 
relative to navigation points, a visual depiction of 
navigation and control parameters, such as translational 
velocity, distance to target, throttle and propellant usage, 
and rate of descent tape.  The PFD provided information 
about vehicle states such as attitude and horizontal and 
vertical velocity and guidance through the dual cue flight 
director.  The Landing Area Display provided information 
about hazards, recommended landing aimpoints, and the 
amount of fuel remaining. 
The Translation Hand Controller (THC) was used to control 
rate of descent by pulling up or pushing down. The Rotation 
Hand Controller (RHC) was used to toggle through landing 
aimpoints during landing aimpoint selection (use of trigger), 
change modes after landing aimpoint selection (use of slider 
button), detect and diagnose failures (use of trigger), control 
pitch and roll (left/right movement of the stick), and abort 
trial (top button).  
Independent Variables 
Two independent variables were investigated in this 
experiment: level of automation and failure frequency.  The 
level of automation factor was within-subjects and included: 
high level of automation and low level of automation.  Prior 
research indicates there is a significant difference in the 
operator’s workload from the high level of automation 
condition to the low level of automation condition, with 
highest workload experienced when the operator is 
responsible for controlling pitch, roll, and rate of descent 
(low level of automation) [1, 2].   Since participants 
reported higher workload in the low level of automation 
condition [1, 2], we expected that accuracy of failure 
detection would be greater in the condition of lower 
workload (high level of automation), where pilots may have 
spare capacity to detect and diagnose failures. 
The second independent variable was failure frequency.  
Participants experienced either a high failure rate (i.e., the 
probability of a failure occurring throughout the set of 
experimental trials was 75%) or low failure rate (i.e., the 
probability of a failure occurring throughout the set of 
experimental trials was 25%).  This two-level factor was a 
between-subjects variable; during the test session, 
participants only experienced a 75% or 25% failure rate, 
which was randomly assigned. 
In this experiment, the failures were system failures rather 
than automation failures. Automation reliability refers to the 
“number of correct operations done by a computer out of the 
total number of operations” [28].  For the purpose of this 
experiment, automation reliability was held constant at 
100%.  Accordingly, if the automation indicated a failure, 
then in fact, a failure was occurring; likewise, if the 
automation showed no manifestation of an anomaly, then no 
failure had occurred.   
Types of Failures 
Participants’ task was to detect and diagnose system 
failures.  Pilots were presented with two types of failures, 
equally distributed regardless of the failure frequency.  If a 
failure was detected, participants had to determine whether 
the anomaly they experienced was a result of a thruster or 
radar failure.   
A thruster (4C) failure occurred when a thruster “failed on” 
upon firing (Figure 2).  The thruster failure was noticeable 
through motion cues and abrupt movements in the attitude 
indicator.  In the low automation case, the failure produced 
a pitch down, roll left response, in which the participant had 
to manually input commands to null guidance errors in the 
PFD.  In the high automation case, the thruster failure was 
recognized by the control system through errors in pitch and 
roll.  When the errors exceeded the ±5 degree dead band, the 
control system attempted to null the errors in pitch and roll 
present in the guidance needles.  
 
Figure 2 – Overhead view of Reaction Control System 
jets, with the inset depicting the “outside” view of the 
thruster pod [29] 
A radar failure, or radar malfunction, resulted in additional 
noise in the altitude tape (in the PFD), rate of descent tape 
(in the PFD), and horizontal velocity vector (in both the 
HSD & PFD).  The additional altitude noise was integrated 
by the vehicle’s automation to compute the guidance, 
despite the vehicle’s attitude truly remaining constant.  In 
the low automation case, participants had to manually input 
commands to null guidance errors.  In the high automation 
case, the control system allowed for the radar failure to 
exhibit itself in the integrated guidance before correcting 
itself (once reaching the ±5 degree dead band).  The radar 
failure was noticeable through the oscillating errors in the 
guidance needles, attitude indicator and increased noise in 
the rate of descent tape and horizontal velocity vector.   
Dependent Variables 
In order to investigate if level of automation had an effect 
on failure detection based on failure frequency, correct 
detection and diagnosis of failures was recorded. For each 
trial, a “hit” was defined by correct detection and correct 
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diagnosis when a failure was present. A false alarm was 
defined as a detection and diagnosis of a failure when a 
failure was not present.  Signal detection statistics were 
derived from the raw data and used as dependent variables. 
D prime (d’) is a signal detection statistic that measures a 
participant’s sensitivity to a target stimulus from 
background stimuli. A larger d’ value implies the signal can 
be more easily detected. An estimate of d’ was calculated 
for each participant by measuring the distribution of hits and 
false alarms using the following formula: d’ = Z(hit rate) – 
Z(false alarm rate). 
Decision criterion is a signal detection statistic that 
measures a participant’s willingness, or minimum level of 
internal certainty, in deciding that a signal is present 
amongst background stimuli.  A larger criterion value 
implies the participant required stronger evidence before 
determining that a signal was present.  A criterion estimate 
was calculated for each participant using the false-alarm rate 
and noise distribution.  
Participants 
Ten instrument-rated pilots completed a simulated terminal 
descent phase to the moon, one female and nine males.  
Participants’ age was between 22 and 38 years. All 
participants were required to have 20/20 vision or corrected-
to 20/20 vision. The participant population included test, 
private, recreational, and commercial pilots, and certified 
flight instructors; several participants held multiple 
certifications. Participants were recruited from local aviation 
companies and all were compensated. NASA Ames 
Research Center and San Jose State University Institutional 
Review Boards approved the protocol. 
Experimental Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to the 25% or 75% 
failure frequency group, with half of the participants (n=5) 
in each group. The total number of trials varied from 66 to 
78 because some participants required more practice trials 
during training. In the test session, all participants 
experienced 32 experimental trials. The two failures 
(thruster and radar) were evenly distributed among each 
participant’s failure trials (i.e. 25% failure frequency = 8 
failure trials = 4 thruster failures, 4 radar failures; 75% 
failure frequency = 24 failure trials = 12 thruster failures, 12 
radar failures). Failures randomly occurred 45 to 60 seconds 
after the trial onset. All participants’ test session trials were 
evenly split to allow them to experience 16 of the trials in 
the high automation condition and 16 in the low automation 
condition. While maintaining this distribution, the 
experimental trials were randomized within the test session.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in four parts: 1) 
questionnaire and experiment familiarization briefing, 2) 
training session where participants were familiarized with 
the experimental tasks and protocol, 3) test session where 
participants experienced experimental conditions and their 
performance data was recorded for analysis, and 4) post 
experimental interview. 
At the start of each session the participant was provided an 
informed consent form.  The participant was then asked to 
answer questions about his/her piloting experience, motion 
sickness susceptibility, and standard demographic 
information.  Following the questionnaire, participants were 
acquainted with the experiment details and their mission 
objectives, during which participants were encouraged to 
ask questions to ensure their understanding of their role in 
the experiment. 
After a VMS safety briefing, the experimental training 
session began, in which the participant learned to operate 
the lunar lander simulator.  During the training session, 
trials initially did not include motion nor failures to allow 
participants to get acquainted with the controls and timing 
of events.  Failures were then incorporated into the training 
trials and participants were taught how to recognize them. 
During training, all participants were exposed to a 50% 
failure rate, independent of their test condition (failure 
frequency group). This setup was important so as to not set 
up an expectation for a particular failure frequency.  
Throughout all the training trials, participants were provided 
feedback with respect to their piloting method, callouts of 
vehicle states (i.e. altitude, fuel, and landmarks), and failure 
detection and diagnosis. All participants’ training session, 
regardless of failure frequency condition, were conducted in 
the same manner.  The number of sufficient training trials 
was determined from previous experiments [2]. 
Each trial began with landing aimpoint selection, in which 
participants’ task was to select the safest landing aimpoint 
from several candidate points, which were overlaid on a 
terrain map (Figure 1).  Participants were instructed to select 
the safest landing aimpoint (i.e., furthest from a hazard, or 
any red area).  During this phase, participants were not 
required to input control inputs, irrespective of the level of 
automation condition.  After the landing aimpoint selection 
phase, the participant flipped the transition switch to change 
the Landing Area Display from a stationary map to a 
moving map and transition to the experimental control 
mode, which changed to low automation or remained in 
high automation. In the low automation condition, the pilot 
was responsible for commanding pitch, roll, and rate of 
descent during the final descent phase, in addition to 
detecting and diagnosing systems failures and attending to 
the callouts. In the high automation condition, flying 
continued to be performed by the autopilot during the final 
descent phase, leaving the pilot to detect and diagnose 
system failures and attend to the callouts. 
The callouts were incorporated to ensure participants were 
cognizant of their situational awareness as well as to 
maintain consistent workload across similar experiments 
[2]. Given that verbal callouts are routine for pilots to 
perform, the verbal callout method of assessing situation 
awareness has high face validity [2, 30].  Throughout both 
control modes, participants’ remained vigilant to the task of 
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failure detection and diagnosis, while attending to the 
callouts. 
During the test session, all participants experienced 32 
experimental trials, each high automation trial lasting 80 
seconds and low automation trials lasting 95 seconds. 
Failure timing randomly occurred between 45 to 60 seconds 
after the trial onset.  
 
6. RESULTS 
The research goals were to evaluate pilots’ failure detection 
performance during flying and landing on the lunar surface 
as they adapted to spacecraft failures, failure frequency, and 
different spacecraft levels of automation. The purpose of 
this experiment was to measure failure detection 
performance of participants as they flew the lunar lander 
simulator under two levels of automation (high automation 
and low automation) and two levels of failure frequency 
(75% failure rate and 25% failure rate). Signal detection 
theory (SDT) was the underlying method used to evaluate 
the ease or difficulty of detecting a failure from among 
background noise (d’) and participants’ decision criteria in 
determining whether a failure had occurred (criterion).  The 
rationale in applying SDT was to quantify participants’ 
ability to detect failures, that is, measure how they make 
decisions under ambiguous conditions. A standard 
correction was first calculated for hit rates of 1.0 and false 
alarm rates of 0 [31].  Two-way mixed measures ANOVAs 
were performed to test for mean differences between 
groups, where the significance level adhered to was α = 
0.05.  
Hits and False Alarms 
For each trial, a hit was defined as correct detection and 
correct diagnosis when a failure was present.  A false alarm 
was defined as a detection and diagnosis of a failure when a 
failure was not present.  In assessing the overall hit rate, it 
was observed that participants achieved a mean hit rate of 
92.5% in the high failure frequency condition and a mean 
hit rate of 87.5% in the low failure frequency condition 
(Table 1).  In assessing the overall false alarm rate, it was 
observed that participants achieved a mean false alarm rate 
of 14% in the high failure frequency condition and a mean 
false alarm rate of 19% in the low failure frequency 
condition (Table 2).  
 
Table 1. Hit Rate Means by Condition 
Condition 
Failure Frequency 
25% 75% 
Automation 
Level 
High 0.83 0.93 
Low 0.78 0.92 
 
Table 2. False Alarm Rate Means by Condition 
Condition 
Failure Frequency 
25% 75% 
Automation 
Level 
High 0.12 0.13 
Low 0.26 0.15 
 
D Prime 
Results showed no significant difference for level of 
automation F(1, 8) = 1.635, p = 0.237; no significant 
interaction between conditions, F(1, 8) = 0.590, p = 0.465; 
but here was a significant main effect for failure frequency, 
F(1, 8) = 5.457, p = 0.048. Overall, the participants who 
experienced the 75% failure frequency condition had an 
easier time detecting and diagnosing failures than did 
participants who experienced the 25% failure frequency 
condition (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 – D Prime mean differences between level of 
automation and failure frequency (* indicates 
significance) 
 
Decision Criterion 
Decision criterion was used to identify any difference in 
participants’ judgment regarding the presence of a failure. 
Results showed no significant difference for level of 
automation F(1, 8) = 1.495, p = 0.256; no significant 
difference for failure frequency, F(1,8) = 0.042, p = 0.842; 
and no significant interaction between level of automation 
and failure frequency, F(1, 8) = 0.662, p = 0.440.  The lack 
of significance for any of the experimental conditions 
indicates that the participants had relatively equal 
willingness to detect a failure, regardless of failure 
frequency and level of automation (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – Criterion mean differences between level of 
automation and failure frequency 
 
Post-Experimental Questions 
After each experimental session, participants were asked 
questions regarding their experience.  Two participants felt 
they did not have enough training learning to fly the vehicle 
and only one participant felt he did not have enough training 
in identifying failures. These participants’ data was not 
removed from the analyses because we felt their flying 
performance and failure detection performance was 
satisfactory. Despite the unique flight control task, the 
majority of participants felt comfortable flying the lunar 
lander and identifying each of the two failures (radar 
malfunction and thruster failure).   
Participants’ responses varied in the post-experimental 
questions, though there were some responses that did stand 
out. Across failure frequency groups, a few of the 
participants commented on their perception of “ease” of 
failure detection as a function of level of automation. For 
instance, one participant commented: “It was harder to 
recognize a failure if you weren’t on guidance.  It was easier 
to detect failures on autopilot (high automation condition).” 
However, experimental results did not support these 
perceptions. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this research was to examine the interaction 
between level of automation and failure frequency on failure 
detection and diagnosis. The results from this experiment 
indicate that failure frequency affects participants’ ability to 
detect failures. Failure frequency could be included as a 
factor while training in complex, human-automation 
systems. Training on system failure detection allows 
operators to better learn and understand the system’s 
strengths and weaknesses [32, 33].  These results can be 
evaluated in the context of simulated spacecraft training, 
suggesting that while pilots can effectively learn to detect 
and diagnose spacecraft failures when exposed to high 
failure frequencies, that assessment of failure detection and 
diagnosis should be completed both at high and low failure 
frequencies. This type of training may help people better 
understand automation and gain the appropriate level of 
confidence, so as to not over- or under-rely on automation. 
These results also validate on-going research on failure 
detection and diagnosis of human supervisory controlled 
spacecraft. Investigating human performance can be 
consistently achieved by testing one, consistent failure 
frequency, preferably one that is high so as to be able to 
evaluate other effects on failure detection and diagnosis.   
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